













Some philosophers doubt that artistic fiction can contribute to knowledge: “A story therefore enables its audience to assimilate events, not to familiar patterns of how things happen, but rather to familiar patterns of how things feel”.​[1]​ But in feeling a familiar “Aha. Of course”,

[…] the audience of narrative history is subject to a projective error. Having made subjective sense of historical events, by arriving at a stable attitude toward them, the audience is liable to feel that it has made objective sense of them, by understanding how they came about.​[2]​






When reading literary fiction, it is natural to ask such questions as “Why does Ahab chase Moby Dick?” The right kind of answer is “because Moby has hurt him”. In some accounts, this explanatory “because” must be sustained by a counterfactual: “If Moby had not hurt Ahab, Ahab would not pursue Moby”. However, this intuitively true counterfactual does not fit the standard analysis of counterfactuals: 

A counterfactual of the form ‘If it were that φ, then it would be that ψ’ is non-vacuously true if some possible world where both φ and ψ are true differs less from our actual world, on balance, than does any world where φ is true but ψ is not true.​[4]​

It is completely open whether a world in which Moby has not hurt Ahab and Ahab does not pursue Moby differs less from the actual world than any world in which Moby has not hurt Ahab and Ahab pursues Moby. What seems relevant to evaluating the counterfactual is closeness not to the actual world but to the world(s) which make(s) the fiction true.​[5]​ I propose to define counterfictionals in the same way as counterfactuals, with the difference that the worlds which make the fiction true play the role the actual world plays in counterfactuals:

A counterfictional of the form ‘According to the fiction F, if it were that φ, then it would be that ψ’ is non-vacuously true if some possible world where both φ and ψ are true differs less from the world of F (i.e. the world in which every sentence  is true that figures in a true sentence of the form ‘in the fiction F, ’) than does any world where φ is true but ψ is not true.​[6]​

Counterfictionals are not confined to explanation. Normally, a subjunctive conditional in a piece of fiction is a counterfictional. And some fiction, for instance rewriting Moby Dick so that Ahab is saved from drowning, may be interpreted as a piece of counterfictional reasoning with regard to the world of a fiction, in this case Moby Dick.
However, what interesting facts can be learnt from explanation in fiction? How do we proceed from explaining in fiction to explanation by fiction? There must be some mechanism of transferring explanation in fiction to the actual world. Counterfictional explanatory relationships may make us aware of corresponding counterfactual relationships. I want to draw a parallel to the way counterfictionals in scientific thought experiments relate to counterfactuals which figure in explanations of actual facts. In some pieces of fiction, which I would like to refer to as cognitive fictions, counterfictionals relate to actual-world counterfactuals in just this way.


Cognition by Fiction: Literature as Thought Experiment

Noёl Carroll draws a parallel between “wheels of virtue” in narrative literature and philosophical thought experiments:

A virtue wheel or virtue tableau comprises a studied array of characters who both correspond and contrast with each other along the dimension of a certain virtue or package of virtue – where some of the characters possess the virtue in question, or nearly so, or part of it, while others possess the virtue, but only defectively […]. Thought experiments […] by systematically varying possibly contributing factors enable us to identify conceptual dependencies and other relations.​[7]​

Literary thought experiments like E.M. Forster’s Howard’s End imaginatively manipulate certain variables such as, in Forster’s case, the opposite virtues of imagination and practicality in order to consider which changes in certain dependent variables result, in Forster’s case, in a more or less “complete and virtuous way of living”.​[8]​ Our concepts of virtues and vices are thus sharpened: “a virtue wheel can provide the opportunity for initiating a guided conceptual analysis or grammatical investigation”.​[9]​ Conceptual analysis may proceed by considering purely fictional cases: “Since the knowledge in question is conceptual, it makes no difference that the cases are fictional”.​[10]​
Carroll enumerates several functions of fictional thought experiments:

Some of the primary functions of philosophical thought experiments include: defeating alethic claims concerning possibility or necessity or deontic claims, […] advancing modal claims about what is possible, and, finally motivating conceptual distinctions.​[11]​

By varying instantiations of virtues and corresponding vices, virtue tableaux uncover necessary or relevant conditions of applying concepts despite the vagueness of language use in literature:

in determining whether we have found an invariant condition for some concept or a reminder of an important variable in certain contexts – the worry about the vagueness of literary implications can be allayed somewhat.​[12]​

Without conveying new empirical data, thought experiments advance by reorganizing tacit knowledge in order to achieve new explicit propositional knowledge: “philosophical thought experiments, examples, and counterexamples function by mobilizing and reorganizing what the listener already knows”.​[13]​
Some caveats, however, are in order here:
(i)	It is not a matter of course that fictional cases are suited to solve conceptual issues.
(ii)	Since philosophy, according to Carroll, consists of conceptual analysis, in order to answer philosophical questions, a literary thought experiment must form part of a piece of conceptual analysis. But recently the idea that philosophy consists of conceptual analysis has come under severe attack.​[14]​
(iii)	Carroll does not answer how we come to appreciate ideal situations like the virtue tableau. Imagining a set of characters and actions cannot be reduced to conceptual analysis. Rather, a host of cognitive capacities, sensory, imaginative, and conceptual, are involved. Reducing the cognitive function of fiction to conceptual knowledge unduly narrows it down.​[15]​ 
So we should rather analyse Carroll’s wheel of virtues along the lines of counterfactual and counterfictional thinking respectively: In an experimental setting, certain variables are imaginatively manipulated in order to substantiate a certain functional relationship which specifies how certain other variables change. In order to spell out such an analysis, I elaborate on the parallel to thought experiments in the natural sciences.


Scientific Thought Experiments: Galilei’s Lesson

The discussion of scientific thought experiments centres on Galilei’s famous experiment on free fall. James McAllister elucidates the dialectical situation of Galilei’s reasoning “by which he claimed simultaneously to discredit the Aristotelian account of free fall and establish his own law that the rate of fall of a body is independent of the body’s mass”.​[16]​ Galilei imagines two bodies, B1 and B2, with the masses m1, and m2, and m1 > m2, joint together so as to yield one body B12 with mass m1 + m2. In the Aristotelian view, if B12 is dropped under ideal conditions, it falls faster than B1 and B2 as its mass is bigger, but its speed ranges in the middle between B1 and B2 because B12 combines their natural velocities. The problem this poses can be avoided by regarding speed as independent of weight.​[17]​
Comparable with Carroll’s view that philosophy deals with conceptual analysis, Tamar Gendler contends that scientific thought experiments are, like philosophical thought experiments, designed to test our tacitly known conceptual commitments in imaginary cases:​[18]​

What the Galilean does is provide the Aristotelian with conceptual space for a new notion of the kind of thing natural speed might be: […] there was no room on the Aristotelian picture for the thought that natural speed might be constant, not varying […], that it might be dependent not on some specific features of the body in question, but only on the fact that it is a body at all. After contemplation of the case, there seems to be no conceptual space for the view that it might be variable.​[19]​

The disagreement between Galilei and the Aristotelian pertains to a fact about speed: does natural speed depend on the specific features of the body in question or not? If Gendler is right, Galilei and the Aristotelian must take this issue to be decided by our concept of speed. But Gendler gives no argument for her interpretation.
For these reasons, I prefer McAllister’s analysis. The Aristotelians’ aim of minutely describing how physical bodies behave in actual situations conflicts with Galilei’s metaphysical background convictions:​[20]​

The world contains causal factors of two kinds: phenomena and accidents. Phenomena are universal and stable modes in which physical reality is articulated. Accidents, by contrast, are local, variable, and irreproducible. Whereas phenomena account for the underlying uniformities and invariances of the world, accidents are responsible for the great variability of natural occurrences […]. Mechanics, for Galileo, aims solely to identify and describe phenomena; no scientific knowledge of accidents is possible in his view.​[21]​

The aim of a scientific experiment is to eschew the accidents and to elucidate the phenomena:

if the influence of accidents could be reduced to zero, it would be possible to read off the properties of the phenomenon from an occurrence. Any such occurrence, of course, would have to be produced artificially.​[22]​

However, when this goal proves unattainable, thought experiments come into play:

In other cases, however, […] it proved impossible to reduce the influence of accidents sufficiently to exhibit a phenomenon […]. Thought experiments represent a continuation of the process of polishing and smoothing […]. If a phenomenon is so subtle that no concrete occurrence can be produced in which the phenomenon is displayed in accident-free form, the phenomenon may be displayed only in an abstract occurrence.​[23]​

Sometimes, disturbing influences cannot be completely extinguished. But the empirically-based competence of performing “polishing and smoothing” procedures of extinguishing accidents can be continued in the imagination in order to see what would happen if all accidents disappeared. The result is a counterfactual claim which results from a – suitably constrained – creative act of the imagination. Given the counterfactual account of fiction, it may be legitimately called a piece of regimented fiction.
This account of thought experiments can be supplemented by what Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden call “functional” thought experiments (due to the idealizing function of thought experiments in science):

The thought experiment […] is implicitly present in many applications of frequentist statistics. A long run of independent observations on the same unit does not exist anywhere in the real world. Almost independent, yes; practically independent, yes; truly independent, no. The notion of independent observations is an idealization, although it often is a useful assumption (it would certainly be a pathological case of hair-splitting to criticize the assumption of independent trials in throwing dice). In virtually every application of inferential statistics, however, the thought experiment is needed.​[24]​

The actual scientific practice of doing frequentist statistics with actual cases inevitably contains an element of thought experimentation which allows to implement suitable idealization.
One main task of thought experiments emerges: idealization. Thought experiments serve as implicit or explicit definers of explanatory scientific relationships as far as the latter rest on idealization.​[25]​ Behind Galilei’s thought experiment looms Newton’s law of gravitation:

F = G m1 m2 / r²
F is gravitational force, m are the masses of the bodies attracting each other, r is distance.

This holds only for certain ideal situations which are putatively never actually realized. The factors we “idealize away” from must be taken into account in order to apply Newton’s law to real-life situations. But sometimes properly appreciating an explanatory relationship requires appreciating it in an ideal situation. We cannot always derive it from real-life situations by an explicit and transparent procedure of subtracting the possibly infinitely many features of these situations which interfere with it such as to yield the ideal case. We must be able to distinguish interfering conditions from ideal conditions, those, that is, obtaining in the ideal situation. Among the latter are those that are explained by the relationship at stake.
Without exerting abilities which guide our sense of what to polish away and what to retain, what to count as interfering conditions or as ideal background conditions, and what to count as intrinsic to the explanatory relationship at stake, we often would not be able to establish the latter. What is usually labelled ceteris paribus conditions is intimately related to thought experiments which allow us to deal with these conditions without completely spelling them out. One cannot be required to specify ideal background conditions completely in a thought experiment. But perhaps one must be disposed to specify, if challenged, any single ideal condition and the ways it could be missed. For instance, in the case of Newton’s law, one could cash in the requirement that the masses m1 and m2 concentrate in mathematical points and so on.
But in how far can thought experiments provide an advantage compared to using tacit knowledge to deal with explanatory relationships in real situations? Explicit thought experiments are only the tip of an iceberg consisting of implicit thought experimenting. When striving for knowledge, we continuously exert the idealizing and discriminating abilities I described. A thought experiment is not merely a result of polishing. Imaginative polishing already is exerting a thought experiment. Explicit thought experiments only make these processes available to public discourse. Sometimes this is necessary in order to trigger a process of publicly recalibrating certain dispositions – abilities which allow to distinguish interfering conditions, idealized background conditions, and the features which directly make up a certain explanatory relationship. The explicit thought experiment serves as a benchmark for calibration.​[26]​
The calibration process shows how we adapt implicit abilities of thought experimenting, although it cannot show how we arrive at them in the first place. They can be trained in the normal way of gathering inductive evidence: Upon encountering series of slightly varying real cases, we come to appreciate certain patterns by imaginatively continuing them. Whence do we know what accidents must be polished away and what features must be retained? I suggest that upon empirically encountering a series of slightly varying real cases, we develop a certain sense of similarity which is exerted and trained by continuing the series in imagination until an ideal situation is reached.
If explanatory relationships are confined to ideal situations, how can they be confirmed by evidence which does not come from such situations? And how can they in turn apply to other situations which are not ideal? It must be required that they apply to non-ideal situations, but only among many other factors. In order to vindicate them, their role in non-ideal situations must be distinguished from the role of other factors. The process of smoothing and polishing must allow one to discern and to anticipate the role of an explanatory relationship in non-ideal situations. This is best achieved in a continuous series of slightly changing non-ideal situations which is continued by the idealization process. This series allows to feed empirical evidence into the thought experiment. For an explanatory relationship to play its role in explaining real situations, the process of smoothing and polishing must be reversible in order to get back from the ideal situation in which a relationship holds perfectly to real situations in which it yields one explanatory factor among others. Again, this is best achieved in a series of slight changes from ideal conditions to non-ideal ones. Both series must be guided by the implicit abilities which guide idealization.


Scientific Thought Experiments, Interventionism, and Counterfactuals

According to the interventionist theory of explanation, an explanatory relationship must hold over a certain range of interventions, manipulating an explanans variable which can be stated by counterfactuals.​[27]​ For instance, my car going faster can be explained thus: the car allows a certain range of velocities depending on a certain range of interventions on the gas pedal. The car goes faster because I press the gas pedal more strongly. If I did not press the gas pedal more strongly, the car would not go faster.​[28]​ However, these counterfactuals must usually relate to the ideal situation in which the relationship obtains. Of course, there must be counterfactuals specifying what would happen if some real situation were somehow different with sufficient accuracy to allow for fruitful and testable interventions. But still, counterfactual thought pertaining not only to real-life situations but to ideal conditions may play an indispensable role in scientific theory-building: “Heuristically, we might think of interventions as manipulations that might be carried out by a human being in an idealized experiment”.​[29]​
According to McAllister,

Galilei’s thought experiment merely establishes that, if the rate of fall of simple and compound bodies were a function of their total mass alone, then the rate of fall of bodies would necessarily be independent of their mass. Ours is not such a world: the rate of fall of bodies in our world is a function of many variables.​[30]​

Galilei merely establishes what would be the case in the ideal situation. Thus, there are three difficulties which are solved by my account of thought experiments:
(i)	Often descriptions of real-life situations and counterfactuals pertaining to interventions in real-life situations will leave underdetermined what would happen in ideal circumstances. If a theory is formulated with regard to such ideal circumstances, it is necessary to have a procedure of figuring out what would happen under such circumstances.
(ii)	Since ideal situations usually do not really obtain, some counterfactuals describing interventions with regard to them must rather be counterfictionals. For instance, I imagine an ideal situation in which Newton’s law perfectly holds: The masses m1 and m2, given their distance r1, attract each other with force F1. I have suggested that the result of this imagination is a piece of fiction. Interventionism might require me to imagine what would happen in this ideal situation upon an intervention that changed distance from r1 to r2. To evaluate this, we need a counterfictional: The possible world in which the ideal initial conditions hold must play the role the actual world plays in evaluating normal counterfactuals.
(iii)	I disagree with McAllister. In order to attain explanations of actual facts, Galilei’s experiment does not only have to reveal what would happen under ideal circumstances but to give rise to a procedure which leads from scientific counterfictionals to counterfactuals. The polishing process yields a continuous series of real-life experimental situations which is further traced in the imagination in order to ultimately attain an ideal situation. In the same vein, a continuous series of slightly varied scenarios leads back from possible idealized situations to real-life situations. Abilities which guide the polishing process must also allow to reverse this process. Idealized situations give rise to counterfictionals which describe variations relative to idealized situations, real situations to corresponding counterfactuals which describe variations relative to real situations. The resulting correspondences between counterfictionals and counterfactuals allow for the former to sustain the latter. We might devise a continuous series of counterfictionals with regard to less and less ideal worlds until counterfactuals are reached which bear explanations of actual facts.


Thought Experiments from Science to Fiction and Philosophy

The virtue tableau Forster presents by Carroll’s lights can be described as an ideal situation for testing a certain relationship between virtue, i.e. the balancing of imagination and practicality, and human flourishing. Forster’s individual protagonists may be seen as the values an input variable assumes upon intervention in a thought experiment. The better the balance an individual strikes, the greater the value of the explained variable and human flourishing; the more an individual inclines to one extreme, the more the explained variable diverges in one direction from flourishing. Note that it would be preposterous to claim that such a relationship lies in our concept of virtue. As in science, Forster starts from an empirical observation – his experience of life and society – and smoothes and polishes away interfering conditions in order to achieve an ideal relationship which explains human behaviour under suitable background conditions. He invites us to adapt our capacities of smoothing and polishing in our apprehending social situations and to reverse his thought experiment so as to apply to real situations.​[31]​
Philosophical thought experiments can also be interpreted along these lines: Carroll’s virtue tableau is an ethical thought experiment. As an alternative, consider Gettier examples. The definition of knowledge as justified true belief can be seen as an explanatory relationship. One knows that p in virtue of justifiably and truly believing that p (of course, the relationship is not a causal one and it does not compete with a causal explanation). This relationship allegedly holds over all normal cases of true belief and justification.​[32]​ The intervention variable is the justification.​[33]​ Gettier’s example can be described by a counterfactual which states a case of true belief which is clearly justified under suitable background conditions, but which does not amount to knowledge: For instance, I know that the faculty’s dean possesses a Ford because I have seen her buying one. But consider the following counterfactual variation: If, unbeknownst to me, she had bought the Ford for her daughter but happened to possess another one herself, I would have a justified belief without knowledge.
But is there a polishing procedure comparable to Galilei’s? It is easy to add surrounding conditions which destroy the evidential achievement of Gettier cases that previously were in good standing: “In philosophy, examples can almost never be described in complete detail. An extensive background must be taken for granted”.​[34]​ In order to eschew such conditions, some idealized thought-experimental setting might be required. Philosophical thought experiments proceed by way of polishing, too. They represent an individual case, a concrete experimental setting, but without actually performing the experiment. This might be the reason why Gettier, like Galilei, presented his reasoning with regard to a concrete case and not as a general argument. So far, we do not have to assume that when we perform a thought experiment, we embark on analysing our concepts. Of course, reshaping concepts of virtue or knowledge may go hand in hand with devising a thought experiment. Yet, in any case, it is by no means clear that mere conceptual knowledge is sufficient for evaluating scenarios like virtue tableaux or Gettier cases.


Fact, Fiction, and Narrative in the Social Sciences

The role of explanation in the social and historical sciences is beset by two main problems:
(i) the problem of laws,
(ii) non-cognitivism about narrative form.
I argue that these problems can be assuaged by the account proposed. I begin with outlining how interventionism allows to cope with the problem of laws.


Interventionism and the Problem of Laws in the Social Sciences

An advantage of the interventionist account of explanation is that it allows to avoid the problem of laws. While laws usually are formulated as universally quantified statements “All A are B”, interventionist explanatory relationships can be confined to a particular object, provided there is a suitably stable functional relationship specifying how this very object behaves under different interventions.​[35]​ The interventionist account is also flexible concerning the range of interventions within which a relationship must be stable.​[36]​ 
Consider Dray’s famous example: “At the end of his life, Louis XIV became unpopular because he pursued policies which were detrimental to the national interests of France”.​[37]​ Dray doubts that a suitable covering-law explanation can be devised. According to the interventionist, we do not have to tailor a law. We merely have to consider a suitable range of counterfactual variations of the following sort: “Had Louis XIV not pursued politics which were detrimental to the national interest of France, he would not have been unpopular”.





According to the “naïve” picture of science, it represents things as they are, and it provides true explanations of them. Especially in the aftermath of Hayden White and Louis Mink’s influential metahistorical studies, the role of narratives has served to question to the validity of this view for the historical and social sciences. Like Velleman, White insists that the emplotment of historical facts in a narrative serves to create a feeling of familiarity.​[38]​ It is completely open whether this feeling correlates with a cognitive achievement. One problem is that White views historical narratives only as convincing if they seem true: “The rhetorical force of historical prose usually depends upon the single solution, the true presentation of the past”.​[39]​ When we look through the mechanisms of historical prose and realize that it is not true, we should come to deem it unsatisfying. For this reason, White’s view is not reflection-proof. Once we adopt it, we should cease to accept historical narratives.
I want to use this account to counter non-cognitivism by exposing the cognitive function of narrative. Conjoining facts and well-regimented fiction is part and parcel of much work in science. Uncovering elements of fiction and artistic writing in history and the social sciences as such does not destroy their credence, for elaborating explanatory relationships is partly fictional in that it draws on idealizing thought experiments. Drawing on the distinction of basic and thick narratives, I demonstrate the cognitive function of basic narratives. Then I show how they are transmitted to thick narratives.


Basic and Thick Narratives

“Basic narrative” refers to whatever we would recognize as a story told. Probably a necessary but not sufficient condition is that a narrative renders a causal connection between at least two events.​[40]​ “I went to the bakery in order to buy a piece of bread” links two events: my going to the bakery, and my buying a piece of bread. It is a basic but not a thick narrative. My going to the bakery is a causal condition of my buying a piece of bread. Thick narratives are basic narratives enriched and embellished by the ways of story-telling established in our culture.
Drawing on psychological evidence, I suggest a naturalistic view of basic narratives. They are privileged as they serve the cognitive task of processing information about one’s environment in order to efficiently deal with it. It is a fact well-established by developmental psychology that we are better in dealing with information if it conforms to typical basic narrative structures.​[41]​ Arguably, one main cognitive task in human development is to develop a sufficiently comprehensive mental map of causal networks to deal with surrounding macroscopic objects, especially other people.​[42]​ Narratives are natural forms of storing and processing certain informational input, namely facts of individual and social life. They make salient what is relevant to acting and anticipating the actions of others. They impose a relevance structure on causal maps. In doing so, they simplify these maps. This is why they may occasionally mislead.
This point does not as a matter of course transfer to the more ambitious thick narratives which are culturally shaped. Yet, narratives in the historical and social sciences achieve their persuasive force mainly due to embedding basic narratives. We may ask why the conventions guiding thick narratives have developed. One answer is that they try to capture what is especially relevant from a human standpoint. To put it with Lewis Coser citing Henry James: “there is no impression of life, no manner of seeing it and feeling it, to which the plan of the novelist may not offer a place”.​[43]​
The novelist’s plan may serve to organize impressions of life, seeing, and feeling.​[44]​ To be sure, I do not want to deny that literature often liberates us from the bounds of cognitive tasks and rationality. Often artistic form may be used as a tool of such liberation. And often it may be used to convey prejudice or satisfy a simplifying sense of fit. But so far nothing rules out that thick narratives may serve, among others, objective cognitive tasks. This rudimentary account gives rise to a classification of narratives along the demarcation between fact and fiction.


Factual, Facto-Fictional, and Fictional Narratives

Mink insists that thick narratives are usually underdetermined by evidence:

just as evidence does not dictate which story is to be constructed, so it does not bear on the preference of one story to another. When it comes to the narrative treatment of an ensemble of interrelationships, we credit the imagination or the sensibility or the insight of the individual historian.​[45]​

However, we praise the successful historian’s “imagination or sensibility or insight” as giving rise to a cognitive achievement. Thick narratives may insert pieces of fiction into historical knowledge. These pieces of fiction usually invest facts with further structure. In doing so, they may feed these facts into a thought experiment. One function of the latter is to fill the gaps in our historical knowledge by ideal conditions. To be sure, the situation is different from the Galilei case. We want to understand an individual event, but in order to do so, the individual event must be considered as normal as possible within the constraints imposed by known fact. Normality here is characterized with regard to a process of polishing those features that distinguish the case from a paradigmatic application of folk causal reasoning. The filling procedure allows to match actual facts on the one hand and candidates for explanatory relationships and the ideal conditions of their obtaining on the other hand. In filling the gaps in the situation of Louis XIV as we know it with ideal conditions, we assess how probable it is under such circumstances that his detrimental behaviour caused his unpopularity. Given basic narratives are supplemented so as to correspond to further, more demanding explanatory relationships.
The historical narratives I have discussed combine fact and fiction. There is another sort of narrative which eschews fictional parts: “purely factual narrative”, as in a protocol. There are also “pure” thought experiments in the social sciences which are not strictly bound by actual facts but partially revise them so as to yield ideal conditions as Galilei’s thought experiments did. To R.G. Collingwood, historiography as opposed to fiction is bound by evidence and consistency.​[46]​ I suggest to somewhat blur Collingwood’s distinction. There may be fiction which revises evidence and nevertheless contributes to understanding history. And as scientists may consider different polishing procedures leading to inconsistent explanatory relationships, historiographers may supplement given facts by several mutually inconsistent pieces of fiction in order to explore by thought experiment how putative explanatory relationships fare. The inconsistency arises from supplementing the same facts by diverging ideal conditions. All these seemingly disparate aspects – a keen strive for accuracy, fictional elements, mutually inconsistent fictions – can be found combined in historiography, for instance in the work of the ancient Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch’ien.​[47]​
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